Bonn -- "My great fear has been that we would make the same mistakes in Kosovo that we made in Bosnia seven years ago. My concern has been that President Milosevic would do as little as possible to meet our demands, except under pressure, and then only at the last minute," Secretary of State Albright said March 25.

Speaking at the second meeting in two weeks of the Contact Group on Bosnia, Albright said, "We have to hold President Milosevic to the London benchmarks, and hold the line on the firm approach we adopted."

The secretary of state spoke emphatically to her colleagues on the Contact Group, which consists of representatives from the United States, UK, Italy, France, Germany, and Russia, listing the agreed steps to be taken:

-- Support immediate adoption of the UN arms embargo resolution by the Security Council;

-- Continue to insist on the Gonzalez mission as well;

-- Get serious dialogue going with both sides entering it without preconditions and with outside participation;

-- Stick to what we have agreed, and come away from the meeting with a statement that will be taken seriously.

Albright also said, "We have agreed to impose additional punitive measures in four weeks" if President Milosevic fails to begin serious dialogue involving both sides and others. "In this respect, let me propose that we set up a working group to study how we will implement an asset freeze and a ban on foreign direct investment, should that prove necessary."

Following is the text of her remarks:

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U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman (Bonn, Germany) March 25, 1998

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT AT THE CONTACT GROUP MEETING

Good morning. I want to thank you, Klaus, for hosting us and to welcome all my Contact Group colleagues to this session. Let me extend a special welcome to Foreign Minister Vollebaek and to Felipe Gonzalez. Let me also thank Carlos Westendorp for joining us.

As you know, last night our political directors agreed on a statement on Bosnia. It confirms that we share the same analysis of the situation there -- and that we are determined to stay the course.

Since we are all in agreement on Bosnia, let us consider that statement approved and turn to the real reason why we are meeting for the second time in two weeks. After all, we have not felt the need to meet this often in a long time. That is because we have not faced a problem in the former Yugoslavia as dangerous as the situation in Kosovo since the last Balkan war began.

As I said on March 9th, my great fear has been that we would make the same mistakes in Kosovo that we made in Bosnia seven years ago. My concern has been that President Milosevic would do as little as possible to meet our demands, except under pressure, and then only at the last minute.

Fortunately, at our last meeting, we all agreed to act before it was too late -- to stop the killing and to encourage both sides to start a meaningful political dialogue.

To that end, we agreed to impose punitive measures against those responsible for the violence. We made it clear they would be lifted if and only if President Milosevic took a number of specific steps to resolve the crisis.

Since our London meeting, [German Vice Chancellor] Klaus [Kinkel] and [French Minister of Foreign Affairs] Hubert [Vedrine] have met with President Milosevic to deliver our message, as has [Russiam Minister of Foreign Affairs] Yevgenyi [Primakov]. Bob Gelbard [special representative of the president and secretary of state for the Dayton Accords] has been to Belgrade, Pristina and Podgorica, and will return after this meeting with Jeremy Greenstock.

The pressure we have begun to apply has begun to produce results. An agreement to implement the education accord was signed Monday. We have seen a change in tone out of Belgrade.

But the first question we must answer today is whether President Milosevic has met the specific demands of the Contact Group. I do not think any of us can credibly say that he has.

Sixteen days ago, we called for special police units to be withdrawn from Kosovo. The Serbian authorities first claimed those units had already left. Then, in his meeting with Klaus and Hubert, President Milosevic promised they would leave. But today, they are digging in, not pulling out. As we have plainly seen on CNN, new police emplacements are being built, complete with sandbags and chimneys, where none existed a few days ago.

Sixteen days ago, we also called on President Milosevic to allow access to Kosovo to humanitarian groups and representatives of the Contact Group. Yet, diplomats and aid workers have continued to be harassed, threatened, arrested and even beaten by Serbian police. Americans have been the special targets of this campaign, but the aim is clearly to intimidate us all.

We also demanded in London that President Milosevic commit himself publicly to unconditional dialogue. Since then, President Milosevic has named a representative to possible talks. But only Serbian President Milutinovic has committed to anything in public. And he has insisted on preconditions that prejudge the outcome of dialogue -- the very thing we said would be unacceptable. This is a proposal designed to be rejected.

Finally, we asked sixteen days ago that President Milosevic cooperate with the initiatives the Contact Group approved. Yesterday, we learned that President Milosevic has invited Bronislaw Geremek to discuss a resumption of the OSCE Mission of Long Duration. But has not accepted the Gonzalez mission, and on our other points he has sent contradictory signals.

How should we respond to all this bobbing and weaving?

It is possible that in the last two weeks, we have seen the first halting, grudging steps by the "FRY" ["Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"] toward a political solution to the crisis. It is also possible that we have seen nothing more than cynical half-measures, designed to divide us, or to buy time until we lose interest.

Either way, we have to remember that progress has only come about through sustained pressure. If we want more progress, we have to stick together to maintain that pressure. For if we give President Milosevic even a glimmer of a hint that he has done enough, he will most assuredly do nothing more. If we settle for half-measures, all we will get are half-measures.

We have to hold President Milosevic to the London benchmarks, and hold the line on the firm approach we adopted.

We must support immediate adoption of the UN arms embargo resolution by the Security Council. This is the right thing to do. And it is what all of us promised to do when we met 16 days ago. We must continue to insist on the Gonzalez mission as well. All this is essential for maintaining the credibility and unity of the Contact Group.

We are also all in agreement that the only way to avoid disaster now in Kosovo is to get a serious dialogue going. In London, we all agreed that if this dialogue is to have any chance of success after nine years of unrelenting repression in Kosovo, both sides must enter it without preconditions.

Last night, our political directors agreed that we should focus all our efforts on this goal. President Milosevic must begin the process of dialogue now; he must accept outside participation; and we will hold him accountable for any delay on the part of the "FRY" or Serbian authorities. We have agreed to impose additional punitive measures in four weeks if he fails to do this.

In this respect, let me propose that we set up a working group to study how we will implement an asset freeze and a ban on foreign direct investment, should that prove necessary.

I know no one relishes the prospect of more sanctions. I know it is tempting to say "positive" pressure will work better. But our experience teaches us not to be misled by our hopes.

Think of all the peace plans that were advanced during the Bosnian war. How many times did one party or another appear to accept our proposals, only to walk away? We saw then that in the former Yugoslavia, promises mean little until they are implemented with safeguards. Incentives tend to be pocketed; warnings tend not to be believed. Leaders respond not to the distant threat of sanctions, but to the reality of sanctions.

Today we can prove that we have learned these lessons.

Let us also give serious thought today to how the Kosovar Albanians will perceive our actions. Most have stuck to non-violence. Dr. Rugova has made a commitment to unconditional dialogue. But the responsible leaders in Kosovo can persevere only as long as we back them up with pressure against Belgrade. We must be firm so that they can be flexible.

Time is not on the side of moderation. Every moment of delay on President Milosevic's part increases the likelihood of violence. Every moment of hesitation on our part increases the likelihood that he will delay.

On March 9 we agreed on a common approach to move him forward. I expect we will have a full and open discussion about how to carry it out. But I should say that I'm more concerned about effectiveness of outcome than harmony of process. We need to stick to what we have agreed, and come away from this meeting with a statement that will be taken seriously. I can assure you the United States will do what is necessary.

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